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THE PEOPi.E, Respondent, v. JOHN CALVIN ODLE,
Appellant.
[1] ilomicid&-:tr.dence.-A first degree murder conviction is

sustained 11) evidence, among other things, that defendant,
after tellmg !riends that he would kill his estranged wife if she
refused to p.~lltJ1 to him, went to her place of employment,
asked her ~~ her employer to accompany him to a back room,
shot her se~~a: times and later confessed to killing her with
a gun purebu",d for such purpose.
[2] Criminal 14.. - Appeal- Modification of Judgment. - Pen.
Code, § 12'J., does not vest power in an appellate court to
modify a ju':~:,ent in the absence of error in th. proceedings.
[3] Id.-Appeal-!.eduction of Punishment Imposed.-The 1949
amendment I"~ Pen. Code, § 1260, adding "or reduce the degr~
of the offl:1..>,I; or the punishment imposed" to the various
actions an t.{>pellate court may take after reviewing a judgment or oro"·,, did no more than bring the amended section
into accord "'jth Pen. Code, § 1181(6), with respect to reducing the degr~ bf an offense, and make clear that the appellate
court may Fl:docc the punishment in lieu of ordering a new
trial when th',rl: is error relating to the punishment imposed.
[4] Homicide - Appeal- Modification of Judgment.-In the absence of error, the Supreme Court has no power to substitute
a sentence 1<, life imprisonment for a death penalty imposed
by the trial court in its discretion under Pen. Code, § 190,
upon a cODvir:tion of first degree murder in a trial in which
a jury was \Waived.

APPEAL (aut{Jmatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County.
Robert Gardner, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution fCJr murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
death penalty, affirmed.
[2] See 8 Cal.Jur. 636; 3 Am.Jur. 679.
[3] Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by
trial court, notes, 29 A.L.R. 313; 89 A.L.R. 295.
McK. Dig. :.l.eferences: [1] Homicide, § 145(2); [2,3] Criminal
Law, § 1446; [4] Homicide, § 273.
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Z. B. West and Morris Lavine for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General,
and Frank Richards, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal is from a judgment imposing
the death penalty following the conviction of defendant of
first degree murder.
Defendant and deceased were married in Huntington Park,
California, on April 6, 1947. They lived together in Santa
Ana, California, where defendant was employed. Shortly
before Christmas, 1948, deceased became a saleslady and department manager for Davis Stationers on East Fourth Street
in Santa Ana. Early in March, 1950, deceased left defendant
and instituted divorce proceedings that resulted in the entry
of an interlocutory decree of divorce in her favor on April
25, 1950. Defendant repeatedly importuned deceased to return to him, both before and after the entry of the decree.
On April 10, 1950, he quit his employment, presumably because of his depression over the separation. Thereafter not
only did he frequently visit his wife at Davis Stationers 'to
persuade her toteturn to him,but during a great part of her
working hours he stationed himself at the corner of Fourth
and Main, where Davis Stationers was located, or across the
street at points where he could observe his wife and she could
see him. These activities were apparently designed to convince her of his grief and the genuineness of his requests that
she return to him.
During this period, defendant enlisted the aid of several
of their friends to persuade her to return to him. These efforts were unavailing. About the time he quit his employment, defendant informed a friend that he intended to buy
a gun and kill his wife unless she returned to him. On April
13, 1950, he purchased the pistol with which he later killed
his wife. After the purchase he repeated to several friends
that he would kill his wife if she did not return to him. They
informed defendant's wife of his threats, but she apparently
din not take them seriously.
On May 1, 1950, five days before the homicide, defendant
encountered a friend on the street across from Davis Stationers. After some conversation about defendant's marital difficulties and his grief at the separation, defenda.nt stated "Be
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sure and watch the newspapers for the next week or ten days. "
The friend asked "Oh, is that so, John Y" Defendant replied
"Yes, it is too bad, but tbat is just what it has to be."
On the morning of May 6, 1950, the day of the homicide,
defendant took some laundry to a cleaning and laundry agency
that had done work for him for more than two years. He
asked the proprietress to deliver the laundry to the Y.M.C.A.,
where he was then living, "because I don't believe I will be
free to call for it." About 1 :30 p. m. that day, defendant
entered Woolworth's on Main Street, across the street from
Davis Stationers. He talked with the girl in charge of the
candy counter and informed her that he was going across
the street to see his wife, who had better not forget that he
had a gun.
Immediately thereafter, defendant crossed the street, entered the Davis Stationers store and stood by the counter
where his wife was working. Shortly after 2 p. m., defendant
asked his wife and Mr. Davis, her employer, to accompany him
to the stockroom in the rear of the store so that they might
converse quietly. As they entered the stockroom, defendant
repeated his plea for a reconciliation. She refused, and he
then took the pistol from his pocket and shot her. As she
fell forward he fired two more shots into her body and head.
Mr. Davis ran out the back door just as defendant fired a
shot at him that lodged in the door behind him. In the ensuing excitement, defendant escaped out the back door. He went
immediately to the Santa Ana police station and surrendered.
He told the desk officer in charge "I have just shot my wife.
She is at the Davis Stationery Store. I have just shot my
wife. Here, take this gun." After questioning by several
police officers, defendant signed a full confession that he had
killed his wife with the gun, which he had purchased for that
purpose.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity and waived a trial by jury. It was stipulated that
the evidence given in the trial on the plea of not guilty could
be considered by the trial judge in the trial on the plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity. Following testimony establishing the foregoing facts, defendant introduced without objection the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Victor Parkin, to
establish that defendant was mentally ill and therefore not
capable of forming a clear intention to kill. Dr. Parkin conceded that defendant's menta] illness did not meet the tests
()f legal insanity, but stated that it precluded his formation
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of an intention to kill "with the clarity of thought that would
make him entirely guilty of an act of murder. Homicide,
yes. " The trial court found defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree, but reserved its decision fixing the penalty
until after the trial on the plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity.
In that trial Dr. Robert Wyers, a psychiatrist called by the
court, testified that in his opinion defendant was legally sane;
that he knew the nature and consequences of the act of kill·
ing his wife; that although he was in need of psychiatric
treatment, he was not psychotic but was in fact classifiable
as mentally normal; and that he was capable of planning the
murder of his wife and executing his plan with full knowledge
of what he was doing. The opinion of Dr. Wyers was corrobo·
rated by Dr. William Musfelt, another psychiatrist called by
the court, and by Dr. Hyman Tucker, a psychiatrist called by
the prosecution. Defendant called no witnesses. The trial
court thereupon found defendant sane and sentenced him to
be executed.
[1] The foregoing evidence is clearly sufficient to support
the trial court's determination that defendant committed a
wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and is therE'fore
guilty of murder of the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.) De·
fendant contends, however, that the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the penalty of death rather than life
imprisonment, and that this court. has power under the 1949
amendment to Penal Code, section -1260, to reduce the penalty
to life imprisonment.
That section provides:
'c The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or
order appealed from, 0" ,.educe the deg,.ee of the offense 0"
the punishm.ent imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify
any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent
upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a
new trial." (Italicized provisions added by Stats. 1949, ch.
1309, § 1.)
Before the amendment of section 1260 it was settled that
this court had no power to review thE' exercisE' of the jury's
or trial court's discretion in fixing thE' pE'nalty for first degree
murder. (People v. Danielly, 33 Cal.2d 362. 383 f202 P.2d
18] ; People v. Tuthill, 32 Ca1.2d 819. 827 f19S P.2d 505].)
Similarly, it could not reweigh thE' E'vidence in determining
whether the trier of fact had correctly decided the degree of
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the offense, but could only order a rednetion in the degree if
the evidence was legally inadequate to support the finding of
the higher degree. (Pen. Code. § 1181 (6) ; People v. Thomas,
25 CaJ.2d 880, 905 [156 P.2d 71; People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d
164.186 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 144
[]69 P.2d ]).) It is necessary to determine, therefore, whether
the amenoment to section ]260 was intended to broaden the
scope of appellate review over the determination of the degree
of the offense and the punishment therefor.
In the light of the legislati've history of sections 1260
and 1181 of the Penal Code, we have concluded that the 1949
amendment was not intended to broaden the scope of appellate review. Before 1927 if it was determined on appeal that
the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty
of a higher degree of an offense but sufficient to support a
verdict of a lower degree, the appellate court had no power
to order a modification of the judgment but was required to
reverse the judgment and order a new trial. (People Nagy,
199 Cal. 235, 239 [248 P. 906].) At that time subdivision 6
of section 1181 of the Penal Code provided that the trial court
could grant a new trial when the verdict was contrary to law
or evidence. To obviate the necessity of a new trial, when
tIll' insufficiency of the evidence went only to the degree of
the crime, the Legislature in 1927 amended section 1181 to
provide for modification of the judgment either by the trial
or appellate court when "the evidence shows the defendant
to be not guilty of the deln'ee of the crime of which he was
convicted. but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser
crime included therein." (Pen. Code, § 1181 (6) ; see People
v. Kelley. 208 Cal. 387, 391-392 [28] P. 609].)
In 1949 the Special Crime Study Commission on Criminal
Law and Procedure in its second progress report recommended
a further amendment to Penal Code, section 1181, to obviate
the necessity of granting new trials when the punishment
fixed by the jury or trial court was not supported by the law
or evidence. The commission stated, "At the present time a
trial judge on the hearing of a motion for a new trial is authorized in a proper case, in lieu of granting said motion, to
modify the verdict so as to reduce the degree of the offense
of which the defendant stands convicted but has no authority
to change or modify the punishment in those cases in which
the fixing of the punishment is part of the verdict. If sHch
authority were vested in the trial court it is believed that in
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certain circumstances a new trial <11 the ('ntire cause might be
avoided." (Seeond Progress Heport of the Special Crime
Study Commissiun .>n Criminal Law and Procedure [March 7,
1949] Proposal XXVIII, p. 20.) The pruposed amendment
provided that this power, lIke that given in subdivision 6 of
section 1181, should extend to any court to which the case
mlght be appealed. To bring section 1260 in accord with
subdIvision 6 and the proposed new subdivision, the commission recommended the amendment to section 1260 providing
that the appellate court might reduce the degree of the offense
or the punishment imposed. (Proposal XXIX, p. 21.)
Although the Legislature failed to pass the proposed amendment to section 1181 but did enact the amendment to section
1260, it is nevertheless clear from the legislative history that
the amendment was designed, not to increase the scope of
appellate review over the fixing of the degree or punishment
of crime, but to bring section 1260 in accord with section 1181
with regard to the reduction of the degree of crime and to
make clear that the appellate court can reduce the punishment
rather than grant a new trial when the evidence does not
support the punishment imposed .
. In view of the holding before the 1927 amendment to section 1181, that the court could not modify a judgment to
correct the degree of the crime fixed by a jury (People v.
Nagy, supra, 199 Cal. 235, 239), the Legislature may have
been fearful that the same rule would apply when the evidence was insufficient to support the punishment imposed. For
example, section 209 of the Penal Code provides for different
punishments depending on whether or not the victim of a
kidnapping suffers bodily harm. Under the rule of the Nagy
case, assuming its applicability, an appellate court could not
modify the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial when
the jury specified the greater punishment and there was no
evidence that the victim suffered bodily harm. A comparable
situation might have arisen under sections 192 and 193 of
the Penal Code, which make the punishment for manslaughter
in the driving of a vehicle depend on whether or not there was
gross negligence.
[2] Section 1260 now makes clear that the court can reduce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when
the only error relates to the punishment imposed. It does
not, howt'ver, vest power in thr court to modify a judgment
in the absence of error in the proceedings. It lists the vari-
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the offense, but could only order a reduction in the degree if
the evidence was legally inadequate to support the finding of
the higher degree. (Pen. Code. § 1181(6); People v. Thomas,
25 Ca1.2d 880, 905 [156 P.2d 71; People v. Bender. 27 Ca1.2d
164,186 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 144
[169 P .2d 1].) It is necessary to determine, therefore, whpther
the amendment to section 1260 was intended to broaden the
scope of appellate review over the determination of the degree
of thc offense and the punishment therefor.
In the light of the legislative history of sections 1260
and 1181 of the Penal Code, we have concluded that the 1949
amendment was not intended to broaden the scope of appellate review. Before 1927 if it was determined on appeal that
the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty
of a higher degree of an' offense but sufficient to support a
verdict of a lower degree, the appellate court had no power
to order a modification of the judgment but was required to
reverse the judgment and order a new trial. (People Nagy,
199 Cal. 235, 239 [248 P. 906].) At that time subdivision 6
of section 1181 of the Penal Code provided that the trial court
could grant a new trial when the verdict was contrary to law
or evidence. To obviate the necessity of a new trial. when
the insufficiency of the evidence went only to the degree of
the crime. the Legislature in 1927 amended section 1181 to
provide for modification of the judgment either by the trial
or appellate court when "the evidence shows the defendant
to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was
convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser
crime included therein." (Pen. Code, § 1181 (6) ; see People
v. Kelley. 208 Cal. 387, 391-392 r281 P. 609].)
In 1949 the Special Crime Study Commission on Criminal
Law and Procedure in its second progress report recommended
a further amendment to Penal Code, section 1181, to obviate
the necessity of granting new trials when the punishment
fixed by the jury or trial court was not supported by the law
or evidence. The commission stated, "At the present time a
trial judge on the hearing of a motion for a new trial is authorized in a proper case, in lieu of granting said motion, to
modify the verdict so as to reduce the degree of the offense
of which the defendant stands convicted but has no authority
to change or modify the punishment in those cases in which
the fixing of the punishment is part of the verdict. If such
authority were vested in the trial court it is believed that in
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certain circumstances a new trial vI the I'lltire cause might be
avoided." (Seeond Progress Report of the Special Crime
Study Commission un Criminal Law and Procedure lMarch 7,
1949] Proposal XXVIII, p. 20.) The proposed amendment
provided that this power, hke that given in subdivision 6 of
section 1181, should extend to any court to which the case
might be appealed. To bring section 1260 in accord with
subdIvision 6 and the proposE'd new subdivision, the commission recommendE'd the amendment to section 1260 providing
that the appellate court might reduce the degree of the offense
or the punishment imposed. (Proposal XXIX, p. 21.)
Although the Legislature failed to pass the proposed amendment to section 1181 but did enact the amendment to section
1260, it is nevertheless clear from the legislative history that
the amendment was designed, not to increase the scope of
appellate review over the fixing of the degree or punishment
of crime, but to bring section 1260 in accord with section 1181
with regard to the reduction of the degree of crime and to
make clear that the appellate court can reduce the punishment
rather than grant a new trial when the evidence does not
support the punishment imposed .
.In view of the holding before the 1927 amendment to section 11811 that the court could not modify a judgment to
correct the degrE'€ of the crime fixed by a jury (People v.
Nagy, supra, 199 Cal. 235, 239), the Legislature may have
been fearful that the same rule would apply when the evidence was insufficient to support the punishment imposed. For
example, section 209 of the Penal Code provides for different
punishments depending on whether or not the victim of a
kidnapping suffers bodily harm. Under the rule of the Nagy
case, assuming its applicability, an appellate court could not
modify the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial when
the jury specified the greater punishment and there was no
evidence that the victim suffered bodily harm. A comparable
situation might have arisen under sections 192 and 193 of
the Penal Code, which make the punishment for manslaughter
in the driving of a vehicle depend on whether or not there waS
gross negligence.
[2] Section 1260 now makes clear that the court can reduce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when
the only error relates to the punishment imposed. It does
not, howE'ver, vest power in th(' court to modify a judgment
in the absence of error in the proceedings. It lists the vari-
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ous actions that an appellate court may take after reviewing
an order or judgment. Thus, the court Illay "reverse, affirm,
or modify" as well as "reduce the degree of the offense or
the punishment imposed." The section does not purport to
set forth any test for determining which of the various possible actions the court should take. It has never been seriously
contended that this section vests the court with power to reverse a judgment, when the evidence supports it and there
has been no error in the proceedings, nor has it been contended that it vests the court with power to affirm a judgment even though there is no evidence to support it or there
has been other prejudicial error. Whatever action the court
has taken with respect to a judgment or order has always
depended on whether or not there was error in the proceedings and if so whether the error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 4lj2') The 1949 amendment adding the words,
"or reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed" sets forth no different test for determining what action the court should take and vests the court with no more
power to reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment
imposed than it has to "reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment
or order appeaJed from." To construe the section otherwise
would give the court clemency powers similar to those vested
in the governor (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 1), and raise serious
constitutional questions relating to the separation of powers.
(Cal. Const., art. III, § 1; see In f'e McGee, 36 Ca1.2d 592,594
[226 P.2d 1], and cases cited in 24 C.J.S. 1091, note 26.)
[3] It cannot reasonably be concluded that by adding "or
reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed"
to the various actions an appellate court may take after reviewing a judgment or order, the Legislature intended radically
to alter the scope of appellate review and permit the court
in every case, regardless of error, to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court or jury. We hold, therefore, that
the amendment did no more than bring section 1260 into
accord with section 1181( 6) with respect to reduction of the
degree of an offense and make clear that the court may reduce
the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when there is
error relating to the punishment imposed. The test for determining what action should be taken remains the same:
was there prejudicial error in the proceedings' [4] When,
8S in this case, the triaJ court is vested with discretion to
determine the punishment (Pen. Code, § 190). and there has
been no error, this court has no power to substitute its judg-
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ment for that of the trial court. (People v. Danielly, supt"a,
33 Cal.2d 362, 383; People v. Tuthill, supra, 32 Cal.2d 819,
827.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SHENK, J.-I concur in the judgment but I do not agree
with the definite implication in the majority opinion that this
court has the power to reduce the punishment and thus commute the sentence from death to life imprisonment even in
the presence of error. The power of commutation of sentence
and pardon is vested exclusively in the governor by section 1
of article VII of the Constitution and even that power is cir·
cumscribed by the provision in the same section that the chief
executive may not extend executive c.Iemency by granting a
commutation of sentence or a pardon to a person twice con·
victed of a felony without the "written recommendation of a
majority of the judges of the Supreme Court." The provi.
sions of the Constitution are "mandatory and prohibitory."
(Art. I, § 22.) When power is vested by the Constitution in
one branch of the state government it is incompetent for
another branch to exercise it. The latest expression of thi!':
court on the subject is found in I'll, re McGee, 36 Ca1.2d 592
[226 P.2d 1], where it was held that when a power has been
expressly vested in the Legislature (in that ease to determine
the qualifications of one of its members) the courts are with·
out authority to assum<> jurisdiction over the controversy.
It was there stated, at page 594: "The powers of the government of the state are divided into the legislative, executive and
judicial, and neither shall exercise the powers of the other
'except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. '
(Cal. Const., art III, § 1.)" Here the power of commutation of sentence is expressly vested in the governor and it is
beyond the power of the Legislature to transfer that function
to the courts as was attempted by an amendment of section
1260 of the Penal Code in 1949. There is no other provision
of the Constitution, express or otherwise, directing or permitting the courts to exercise the power thus vested in the chief
executive. Section 4%" article VI (adopted in 1926), authorizing the Legislature to grant to the courts of appellate jurisdiction the power to make findings contrary to or in addition
to those made by the trial court does not by any manner of

)

60

PEOPLE 11. ODLE

[37 C.2d

means confer upon the Legislature the right to authorize this
court to exercise the power of commutation of sentence and
thus reduce the punishment from death to life imprisonment.
Section' 956a of the Code of Civil Procedure (added in 1927)
is the enactment designed to carry into effect the constitutional
amendment of 1926. That amendment was first construed and
applied in Tupman v. Haberkern (1929),208 Cal. 256 [280 P.
970]. The power thus conferred on the courts applies only
to cases where "trial by jury is not a matter of right or where
a trial by jury has been waived. I t This powl:r has never been
exercised in criminal cases for the obvious reason that trial
by jury in such cases is a matter of right and following a
waiver of a jury trial the court is not authorized to make
findings of fact as contemplated by sections 632 and 956a of
the Code of Civil Procedure. In People v. Willison (1932),
122 Cal.App. 760 [10 P.2d 766], it was rightly said, at pages
762 and 763, with reference to the power to be exercised pursuant to section 4% of the Constitution, that "It was 8'ot intended that the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court should
be permitted to make findings of fact and thereby change
verdicts rendered in jury trials." (See, also, People v. Myers,
122 Cal.App. 675 [10 P.2d 498].)
Section 1181 (6) of the Penal Code was amended in 1927
to authorize on appeal the reduction in the degree of the
crime. There was and is no constitutional inhibition foreclosing the Legislature from conferring that power. This court
recognized that fact and first exercised the power in People
v. Kelley (1929),208 Cal. 387 [281 P. 609]. There is a vast
difference between a change in the degree of the crime under
the law and the evidence and a change in the punishment.
The former involves the application of the law to the facts
and is the function of the court. The latter is a matter of
executive clemency, a power exercisable exclusively by the
governor under the Constitution and without restraint so far
as the law and the facts are concerned, except, as stated, in
the case of a recidivist.
It is conceded by the majority that if there is no error in
the record the court, under the authorities, may not reduce
the punishment and thus commute the sentence from death
to life imprisonment. When there is error it is a function of
the court to determine whether that error, in view of the entire
record, has resulted in a miscarriage of justice and is therefore prejudicial. If prejudicial error does not appear the
judgment should be affirmed. If prejudicial error is deter-
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mined to be present, it is the function and duty of the court
to reverse the judgment or, in a proper case, to reduce the
degree. There is no power in the chief executive to r~duce
the degree. It is his function to commute the sentence from
death to life imprisonment or to some lesser period of confinenwnt or to execute 8 pardon pursuant to the cOllstitutional
section. The punishment is fixed in the first instance by the
jury under proper instructions as to the law or by the court
where a jury has been waived. Any change in the punishment
thereafter either by commutation from death to life imprisonment or to a shorter period, is just as much the exclusive constitutional function of the chief executive as the granting of
a pardon, and I assume that no one would even intimate that
by an amendment of the code the Legislature could transfer
the pardoning power from the governor to the Supreme Court.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur In the judgment.
I do not agree with any implications in the majority opinion
that within constitutional limitations the Legislature cannot,
or that it has not, empowered this court to reduce punishment
•• in the interest of justice" in any case in which it may
appear necessary or proper so to do.
The source ,of the legislative power is section 4% of article
VI of the California Constitution.! The pertinent act of the
Legislature is section 1260 of the Penal Code. 2

'Section 4%: "In all eases where trial by jury is not a matter of
right or where trial by jury has been waived, the legislature may grant
to any court of appellate jurisdiction the power, in its discretion, to
make findings of fact contrary to, or in addition to, those made by
the trial court. The legislature may provide that such findings may be
based on the evidence adduced before the trial court, either with or
without the taking of additional evidence by the court of appellate
jurisdiction. The legislature may also grant to any court of appellate
jurisdiction the power, in its discretion, for the purpose of making
such findings or for any other purpose in the interest of justice, to
take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time
prior to the decision of the appeal, and to give or direct the entry of
any judgment or order and to make such further or other orders as the
ease may require."
·Section 1260: "The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment
or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the
proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such jndgment or order,
and may, if proper, order a new trial."

